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6	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7	DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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9	SAMUEL HOWARD, )
10	Petitioner, ) 2:93-CV-01209-LRH-LRL
11	vs. ) ORDER
12	E.K. McDANIEL, et al.,
13	Respondents.
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15	Petitioner Howard has filed a <i>pro se</i> motion for appointment of new counsel. Docket
16	
17	to replace Patricia Erickson, who had been relieved as Howard's counsel in this capital habeas
18	action. Docket #223.
19	Howard asserts two reasons for requesting appointment of new counsel to replace the FPD,
20	neither of which is a sufficient ground for granting his motion. First, Howard claims that Erickson,
21	against whom he has filed a grievance with the Nevada State Bar Association, "works with" the
22	FPD. Second, he alleges that the FPD represents inmates who physically attacked him on two
23	occasions.
24	By statute, an indigent habeas petitioner asking the federal court to vacate or set aside a deat
25	sentence is afforded a mandatory right to legal counsel and related services. 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2)
26	Although there is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in habeas corpus cases

(*Pennsylvania v. Finley*, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987)), there is case law that suggests that, in some respects, the statutory right to counsel in a federal habeas proceeding is on equal footing with a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a criminal trial. *See McFarland v. Scott*, 512 U.S. 849 (1994). Indeed, both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that § 3599(a)(2) (previously codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B)) implicates the same "substitution-of-counsel standards" as does the Sixth Amendment. *See Johnson v. Gibson*, 169 F.3d 1239, 1254 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999); *Hunter v. Delo*, 62 F.3d 271, 274 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir.1995).

Even where the Sixth Amendment guarantees appointed counsel, however, an indigent

Even where the Sixth Amendment guarantees appointed counsel, however, an indigent defendant is not entitled to counsel of his own choosing. *Wheat v. United States*, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). In *Johnson*, the court noted that for a petitioner in a capital habeas case to obtain a substitution of counsel, he must "show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict." *Johnson*, 169 F.3d at 1254 (quoting *United States v. Padilla*, 819 F.2d 952, 955 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir.1987). In *Hunter*, the court noted that a criminal defendant's request for new counsel implicates conflicting factors – "the need to ensure effective legal representation, the need to thwart abusive delay tactics, and the reality that an accused is often genuinely unhappy with appointed counsel who is nonetheless doing a good job." *Hunter*, 62 F.3d at 274

Accordingly, the court in *Hunter* held that the standards for granting substitute counsel for a capital habeas petitioner are strict:

[S]ubstitution of counsel is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court. To warrant substitute counsel, a defendant must show justifiable dissatisfaction with appointed counsel [such as] a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney and the defendant. The defendant's right to counsel, however, does not involve the right to a "meaningful relationship" between an accused and his counsel.

*Id.* (quoting *United States v. Swinney*, 970 F.2d 494, 499 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992)). In the context of addressing motions for new counsel, the Ninth Circuit generally defines a *conflict of interest* as "the

existence of competing interests potentially affecting counsel's capacity to give undivided loyalty to his client's interests;" while an *irreconcilable conflict* refers to a dispute or difference between a client and his lawyer. *U.S. v. Moore*, 159 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.1998).

Here, Howard's motion does not contain allegations showing that there is a conflict that warrants the appointment of new counsel. With respect to Erickson's alleged connection with the FPD, Howard states only that he has a pending bar complaint against Erickson and that she "works with the [FPD], Attorneys Michael Pescetta and Franny A. Forsman." Docket #232. He attached to his motion the caption pages for prior filings in his case on which both Erickson and the FPD's office are listed as his counsel (docket ##150/189).

Based on a review of the record, this court notes that the FPD's involvement in Howard's case has been very limited, if not non-existent, since the latest stay was lifted in February of 2005. There is no indication that Erickson was ever employed by the FPD during the course of these proceedings. When recently ordered to show cause why she should not be discharged as counsel, Erickson made no reference to the FPD having any ongoing role in (or responsibility for) Howard's representation. Howard has not explained, or even suggested, how his grievance against Erickson creates a conflict of interest for the FPD.

As for Howard's claim regarding the FPD's supposed representation of inmates who attacked him in the past, Howard does not identify any of the inmates by name or provide any specific information regarding the nature of the FPD's representation of those inmates. Based on the dates on the supporting documents submitted with his motion, the attacks to which Howard refers took place at least seventeen years ago. Here again, Howard does not allege facts that establish either (1) that the FPD would be subject to a conflict of interest or (2) that Howard has an irreconcilable conflict with counsel.

**IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED** that petitioner's *pro se* motion for appointment of new counsel (docket #232/233) is **DENIED**.